Dennett for example has argued that it is physically impossible for a brain in a vat to replicate the qualitative phenomenology of a non-envatted human being.
Strong Realism and Twin-Earth
La Salle, Ill. According to Putnam, it is legitimate to speak of a change in the meaning of an expression only if the reference of the term, and not its stereotype, has changed. In philosophy of mathematics, Stephen Yablo has argued that the Quine—Putnam indispensability thesis does not demonstrate that mathematical entities are truly indispensable.
Hilary Whitehall Putnam (/ ˈ p ʌ t n əm /; July 31, – March 13, ) was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist, and a major figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science.
- According to functionalism, roughly, if something functions as belief then it is a belief.
- While a student of logical positivists including Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap , Putnam was unflinching in his attacks on the excesses of that philosophical movement.
- The debate is ongoing, and it is not clear whether there is an answer that would convince both parties.
- The only thing an Identity Theory of this kind could tell us is that at least one of the mental disjuncts is capable of being realized by at least one of the physical disjuncts.
Amazon.com: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality: 9780521295512: Putnam, Hilary: Books4,2/5(7)
Identity Theory Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Identity Theory. Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states.
11/08/ · mind book pdf reality epub Mind mobile Mind and Reality MOBISsor Hilary Putnam has been one of the influential and sharply original of recent American philosophers in a whole range of fields His important published work is collected here together with several new and substantial studies in two volumes The first deals with the philosophy of .
Hilary Putnam Mind Language And Reality. An encyclopedia of philosophy written by professional philosophers.
He argued that plasticity of mental states between different cognitive agents and even between states of the same agent at different times made possible sameness of mental state in the absence of sameness of functional properties. Putnam : What theories are not. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed.
Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. Putnam : What is mathematical truth? In Mathematics, Matter, and Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. Putnam : Brains and behavior. In Analytical Philosophy Vol. Butler, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. Putnam : Minds and machines. In Dimensions of Mind, ed. Hook, New York University Press, New York, pp. In Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. Hilary Putnam — 91 there remains an important truth in his original insight.
Next we turn to language. Until the late s, the dominant view of how words come to refer to objects in the world had been little changed for thousands of years. The properties odorless, colorless, tasteless, thirst-quenching liquid that I associate with a particular term such as water just are the meaning of the word and the word refers to any object that has those properties.
This definite description theory of reference seemed not only the best theory, but the only conceivable theory. Virtually overnight at least in academic time , a majority of philoso- phers and cognitive scientists were convinced by these arguments.
How could such a thing happen? What kind of argument could they have given to overwhelm years of philosophical momentum? It is re- markable, but they gave no principled arguments. In Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. Since everything, except the microstructure of water, is the same on both planets the question is: Do all of the words in Twin English the language Twin-Earthers speak mean the same thing as they do in English?
Since H2 O and XYZ are both odorless, colorless, etc. Putnam disagrees. And when they did, the externalist revolution was born. The early arguments were just about proper names and natural kind terms, but it soon became a global claim about all mental content. During this period, tracking theories of intentionality or mental content broke onto the scene exploit- ing the Kripke-Putnam insight and offering powerful new theories about how thought and language connects to objects in the world.
Clearly, he is committed to the following: a Metaphysical and epistemological realism: The external world consists in mind-independent objects and we are capable of having knowledge of them; b Semantic externalism: Words refer to whatever real, mind-independent physical objects those 10 H.
Putnam : Brains in a vat. In Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. The very essence of language is now grounded in causal interactions between real, physical states of the agent and real, physical objects in the external world. Putnam had built a realist juggernaut. Putnam was a fan of P. His former realist comrades in arms were aghast. He judged that the combination of realism plus functionalism plus semantic exter- nalism pushed the pendulum too far, by overemphasizing the reductive contribution of an objective world.
It is a basic tenet of realism that radical skepticism is coherent that it is possible that our beliefs are systematically false. Antirealists traditionally reject this tenet insisting that how things seem at least ideally and in the long run cannot be fundamentally different from how they really are — and so radical skepticism is incoherent.
But if skepticism is incoherent, that is precisely what antirealism affirms and realism denies. Thus, it seems, that semantic externalism leads to a rejection of realism.
Hundreds of articles have been written about the BIV argument and there is no consensus regarding its soundness. But the past thirty-five years have shown since its publication that semantic externalism does in- deed have revisionist consequences for how we are to understand our cog- nitive access to a physical world.
Putnam has encouraged serious reflection on the consequences of the externalist revolution. This coincided with the emergence of two new theories — disjunctivism and representationalism — that Putnam flirted with but ultimately rejected. He was convinced that his semantic exter- nalism and a kind of realism was still a crucial part of the picture, but that many current theories were going too far and reducing everything mental to externalist relations.
To capture what was missing, he turned his energies in the last years of his life to a study of perception, co-authoring several papers with Hilla Ja- cobson. In the process of this work, Putnam made an unexpected concession to defenders of phenomenal consciousness or qualia that he had never made before. He made the conces- sion to Ned Block, another student of his and a defender of a robust kind of qualia that is not reducible to the mere informational content about objects that semantic externalism can deliver.
He says 12 The last one of these papers is H. Jacobson and H. Responding to Feyerabend, a number of philosophers expressed concern about the appropriateness of classifying disappearance versions as theories of Mind-Brain Type Identity.
Perhaps the weakest were those of the epistemological variety. It has been claimed, for example, that because people have had and still do have knowledge of specific mental states while remaining ignorant as to the physical states with which they are correlated, the former could not possibly be identical with the latter. The obvious response to this type of objection is to call attention to the contingent nature of the proposed identities—of course we have different conceptions of mental states and their correlated brain states, or no conception of the latter at all, but that is just because as Feigl made perfectly clear the language we use to describe them have different meanings.
The contingency of mind-brain identity relations also serves to answer the objection that since presently accepted correlations may very well be empirically invalidated in the future, mental states and brain states should not be viewed as identical.
After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. And conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial.
As for apparent discrepancies going in the other direction e. If I report the occurrence of a pain in my leg, then the story goes I must have a pain in my leg. But the real import of this discrepancy concerns the purported correlations between mental states and brain states. What are we to make of cases in which the report of a brain scientist contradicts the introspective report, say, of someone claiming to be in pain? Is the brain scientist always wrong?
Something here needs to be said about the difference between Type Identity and Token Identity, as this difference gets manifested in the ontological commitments implicit in various Mind-Brain Identity theses.
Token Identity theories hold that every concrete particular falling under a mental kind can be identified with some physical perhaps neurophysiological happening or other: instances of pain, for example, are taken to be not only instances of a mental state e.
Token Identity is weaker than Type Identity, which goes so far as to claim that mental kinds themselves are physical kinds. As Jerry Fodor pointed out in , Token Identity is entailed by, but does not entail, Type Identity. The former is entailed by the latter because if mental kinds themselves are physical kinds, then each individual instance of a mental kind will also be an individual instance of a physical kind. So the Identity Theory, taken as a theory of types rather than tokens, must make some claim to the effect that mental states such as pain and not just individual instances of pain are contingently identical with—and therefore theoretically reducible to—physical states such as c-fiber excitation.
Depending on the desired strength and scope of mind-brain identity, however, there are various ways of refining this claim. It is important to note, however, that Token Identity theories are fully consistent with the multiple realizability of mental states. Two strategies in particular warrant examination here.
It might even be one brain state in the case of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis. Although Putnam does not consider the possibility of species-specific multiple realization resulting from such phenomena as injury compensation, congenital defects, mutation, developmental plasticity, and, theoretically, prosthetic brain surgery, neither does he say anything to rule them out. And this is not surprising.
One area of the brain could take over the function of another area of the brain that has been injured. Identity statements need to include an explicit temporal restriction.
The danger in such an approach, besides its ad hoc nature, is that the type physicalist basis from which the Identity Theorist begins starts slipping into something closer to token physicalism recall that concrete particulars are individual instances occurring in particular subjects at particular times. At the very least, Mind-Brain Type Identity will wind up so weak as to be inadequate as an account of the nature of the mental. Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to allow for the existence of disjunctive physical kinds.
The search for species- or system-specific identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be identified with the potentially infinite disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation in humans , d-fiber excitation in mollusks , and e-network state in a robot.
Fodor in and Jaegwon Kim , both former students of Putnam, tried coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that disjunctions of physical realizers cannot themselves be kinds. Even if disjunctive physical kinds are allowed, it may be argued that the strategy in question still cannot save Type Identity from considerations of multiple realizability.
Assume that all of the possible physical realizers for some mental state M are represented by the ideal, perhaps infinite, disjunctive physical state P; then it could never be the case that a physically possible life-form is in M and not in P. Nevertheless, we have good reason to think that some physically possible life-form could be in P without being in M—maybe P in that life-form realizes some other mental state.
Infinitely long disjunctions would render the identity claim completely uninformative. The only thing an Identity Theory of this kind could tell us is that at least one of the mental disjuncts is capable of being realized by at least one of the physical disjuncts.
Physicalism would survive, but barely, and in a distinctly non-reductive form. Recently, however, Ronald Endicott has presented compelling considerations which tell against the above argument. There, physical states are taken in isolation of their context.
But one thing is clear—in the face of numerous and weighty objections, Mind-Brain Type Identity in one form or another remains viable as a theory of mind-body relations. Steven Schneider Email: sjs inbox. Identity Theory Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Table of Contents Early Versions of the Theory Traditional Objections Type vs.
Token Identity Multiple Realizability Attempts at Salvaging Type Identity References and Further Reading 1. Type vs. Token Identity Something here needs to be said about the difference between Type Identity and Token Identity, as this difference gets manifested in the ontological commitments implicit in various Mind-Brain Identity theses.
References and Further Reading Armstrong, D.
Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical ...
Hilary Putnam - 1975 - In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press. pp. 33-69. Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Richard G. Heck (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press. On Nature and Language.Buy this book: Find it on Amazon.com
Identity Theory. Identity theory is a family of views on the relationship between mind and body. Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states. University of Pennsylvania - School of Arts & Sciences. 11/23/ · Hilary Putnam introduced multiple realizability into the philosophy of mind. Challenging the “brain state theorists”, who held that every mental kind is identical to some yet-to-be-discovered neural kind, Putnam () notes the wide variety of terrestrial creatures seemingly capable of experiencing pain.
In philosophy of mindthe computational theory of Jennifer Aniston Nipples Nude CTMalso known as computationalismis a family of views that hold that the human mind is an information processing system and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation.
Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts were the first to suggest that neural activity is computational. They argued that neural computations explain cognition. The computational theory of mind holds that the mind is a computational system that is realized i. The theory can be elaborated in many ways and varies largely based on how the term computation is understood. Computation is commonly understood in terms of Turing machines which manipulate symbols according to a rule, in combination with the internal state of the machine.
The critical aspect of such a computational model is that we can abstract away from particular physical details of the machine that is implementing the computation. CTM, therefore holds that the mind is not simply analogous to a computer program, but that it is literally a computational system. Computational theories of mind are often said to require mental representation because 'input' into a computation comes in the form of symbols or representations of other objects. A computer cannot compute an actual object, but must interpret and represent the object in some form and then compute the representation.
The computational theory of mind is related to the representational theory of mind in that they both require that mental states are representations.
However, the representational theory of mind shifts the focus to the symbols being manipulated. This approach better accounts for systematicity and productivity.
See below in semantics of mental states. Recent work has suggested that we make a distinction between the mind and cognition. Building from the tradition of McCulloch and Pitts, the computational theory of cognition Brooke Burns Nude states that neural computations explain cognition. That is to say, CTM entails CTC. While phenomenal consciousness could fulfill some other functional role, computational theory of cognition leaves open the possibility that some aspects of the mind could be non-computational.
CTC therefore provides an important explanatory framework for understanding neural networks, while avoiding counter-arguments that center around phenomenal consciousness. Computational theory of mind is not the same as the computer metaphor, comparing the mind to a modern-day digital computer.
Rather, a computational system is a symbol manipulator that follows step by step functions to compute input and form output. Alan Turing describes this type of computer in his concept of a Turing machine. One of the earliest proponents of the computational theory of mind was Thomas Hobbeswho said, "by reasoning, I understand computation. And to compute is to collect the sum of many things added together at the same time, or to know the remainder when one thing has been taken from another.
To reason therefore is the same as to add or to subtract. At the heart of the computational theory of mind is the idea that thoughts are a form of computation, and a computation is by definition a systematic set of rules for the relations among representations. This means that a Hilary Putnam Mind Language And Reality state represents something if and only if there is some causal correlation between the mental state and that particular thing.
An example Hilary Putnam Mind Language And Reality be seeing dark clouds and thinking "clouds mean rain", where there is a correlation between the thought of the clouds and rain, as the clouds causing rain. This is sometimes known as natural meaning. Conversely, there is another side to the causality of thoughts and that is the non-natural representation of thoughts. An example would be seeing a red traffic light and thinking "red means stop", there is nothing about the color red that indicates it represents stopping, and thus is just a convention that has been invented, similar to languages and their abilities to form representations.
The computational theory of mind states that the mind functions as a symbolic operator, and that mental representations are symbolic representations; just as the semantics of language are Michelle Jenneke Nude features of words and sentences that relate to their meaning, the semantics of mental states are those meanings of representations, the definitions of the 'words' of the language of thought.
Just as new sentences that are read can Hilary Putnam Mind Language And Reality understood even if they have never been encountered before, as long as the basic components are understood, and it is syntactically correct. For example: "I have Hilary Putnam Mind Language And Reality plum pudding every day of this fortnight.
A range of arguments have been proposed against physicalist conceptions used in computational theories of mind. An early, though indirect, criticism of the computational theory of mind comes from philosopher John Searle. In his thought experiment known as the Chinese roomSearle attempts to refute the claims that artificially intelligent agents can be said to have intentionality and understanding and that these systems, because they can be said to be minds themselves, are sufficient for the study of the human mind.
With the paper, the man is to use a series of provided rule books to return paper containing different symbols. Unknown to the man in the room, these symbols are of a Chinese language, and this process generates a conversation that a Chinese speaker outside of the room can actually understand.
Searle contends that the man in the room does not understand the Chinese conversation. Searle argues that this is not real understanding or intentionality.
This was originally written as a repudiation of the idea that computers work like minds. But if the wall is implementing WordStar, if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain. Objections like Searle's might be called insufficiency objections. They claim that computational theories of mind fail because computation is insufficient to account for some capacity of the mind.
Arguments from qualia, such as Frank Hilary Putnam Mind Language And Reality knowledge argumentcan be understood as objections to computational theories of mind in this way—though they take aim at physicalist conceptions of the mind in general, and not computational theories specifically. Putnam himself see in particular Representation and Reality and Kostenlose Fesselspiele first part of Renewing Philosophy became a prominent critic of computationalism for a variety of reasons, including ones related to Searle's Chinese room arguments, questions of world-word reference relations, and thoughts about the mind-body relationship.
Roger Penrose has proposed the idea that the human mind does not use a knowably sound calculation procedure to understand and discover mathematical intricacies. This would mean that a normal Turing complete computer would not be able to ascertain certain mathematical truths that human minds can. Supporters of CTM are faced with a simple yet important question whose answer has proved elusive and controversial: what does it take for a physical system such as a mind, or an artificial computer to perform computations?
A very straightforward account is based on a simple mapping between abstract mathematical computations and physical systems: a system performs computation C if and only if there is a mapping between a sequence of states individuated by C and a sequence of states individuated by a physical description of the system  .
Putnam and Searle argue that this simple mapping account SMA trivializes the empirical import of computational descriptions.
Gualtiero Piccinini identifies different versions of Pancomputationalism. In response to the trivialization criticism, and to restrict SMA, philosophers of mind have offered different accounts of computational systems.
These typically include causal account, semantic account, syntactic account, and mechanistic account. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Family of views in the philosophy of mind.
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